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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case

Appellant/Defendant Shannon Hedrick ("Hedrick") filed a motion ("Summary
Judgment") and requested the Magistrate Court to dismiss Plaintiff/Respondent Roger
Gordon's ("Gordon") custody order, custody action and to remove Gordon from the birth
certificate. Hedrick now misrepresents the facts to this court in her "Statement of the
Case" as she alleged that she, "moved to dismiss Gordon's custody compliant and
challenged the VAP on the basis of 'material mistake of fact' under Section 7-1106(2) of
the Idaho Paternity Act." Appellants Opening Brief p. 1. However, Hedrick's Motion for
Summary Judgment was for the reasons and grounds that Gordon was not the biological
father of M.H. R. 37-39 as reflected in the original Motion for Summary Judgment
attached for reference as Exhibit A herein. Hedrick's Motion for Summary Judgment
failed to identify any law, statute or case that gave the court the ability to dismiss
Gordon's case and terminate his rights.
Hedrick had placed Gordon on the birth certificate of M.H. (Previously M.G.) on
the 4th of November 2010 R. at 63 and the parties lived together until the 1st of March
2013 caring for M.H. as the natural parents Id At 6. Hedrick left the state with M.H.
wherein Gordon filed an action for custody of the minor child M.H.

A temporary

custody order was entered in Case CV 2013-2046C granting Gordon and Hedrick
visitations of M.H.; however, Hedrick requested an order of biological testing to as she
alleged that Gordon was not the father wherein Gordon filed a separate action for
guardianship in Canyon County CV 2013-6155C that was stayed pending the appeal
herein.
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After the Magistrate Court granted Hedrick's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Gordon Appealed and the District Court reversed the Magistrate as the District court
failed to find any record of "fraud, duress or material mistake of fact" as required by
Idaho Code 7-1106(2) despite Defendant's new arguments and factual allegations
brought for the first time on appeal. The Magistrate allowed Plaintiff leave to file an
Amended Complaint for Custody which was filed on or about the 25 th of June 2014.
B. Facts and Course of Proceedings

Ms. Hedrick stated under oath on the 4th of November 2010, to the government
officials of the State of Idaho on the birth certificate of M.H. that, "I [Shannon Lee
Hedrick] acknowledge that the man named above [Gordon] is the biological father of my
child [M.H.]" (R. at 63). Plaintiff was of the understanding and belief that he was the
biological father of M.H. as reflected in the birth certificate signed also by Plaintiff and
as they had lived together since birth with Defendant, Id.
Plaintiff was the primary caregiver of M.H. since birth until the filing of the
petition for custody including dressing, changing diapers, feeding, and taking him to
work and errands as Defendant failed to care for M.H. due to various issues including
drug use and verbal abuse and excessive punishment of M.H. (R. 67-70) Gordon was
also the primary financial provider for M.H. Id.
Defendant left the family home which resulted in Plaintiff filing for custody of
M.H. on or about the 1st of March 2013 to establish custodial rights R. 6-19. Shortly
after, Defendant informed Plaintiff that he may not be the biological father and Plaintiff
filed for a guardianship in CV 2013-6155-C on or about the 24th of June 2013 see R. 6566
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After Plaintiff filed for custody in CV 2013-6155-C and served Defendant with
such, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss (more appropriately labeled a motion for
Summary Judgment) on the 11th of July 2013 herein to remove Roger Gordon from the
Birth Certificate and dismiss his parental rights and custody case. R. 37-45. The Motion
to remove Roger Gordon from the Birth Certificate, terminate his rights, and dismiss his
custody case did not cite any authority, let alone the proper authority, to grant the relief of
removing Plaintiff from the Birth Certificate. See Id.

The Motion also contained

additional facts or affidavits and required 28 days notice pursuant to IRCP 12(c) and
56(c); but was set for the 26th of July 2013, only fifteen days after the motion was filed
without a motion and order to shorten time. R. 59-61
Defendant filed a Pre Trial Memorandum on or about the 29th of August 2013
admitting that she knew with the contrary position that she had made under oath to the
State of Idaho and to Gordon and admitted she knew during the pregnancy of M.H. that
M.H. was the son of another unknown male. R at 61 para. 1 In an attempt to limit the
delay and confusion to M.H., Plaintiff brought the above issues before the court in its
Motion for Relief and was denied.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A. Cross Appellant's Issues Presented

1.

Did the Magistrate Court err or abuse its discretion when it dismissed the

case, removed the Plaintiff from the birth certificate, dismissed Plaintiffs custody order
and Plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Judgment in violation of Idaho Code 7-1106(2)
and IRCP 7(b)(1) as Defendant failed to cite statutory, case law or any basis in law for

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT I CROSS APPELANT'S BRIEF

3

such dismissal and failed to provide any evidentiary support of "fraud, duress or material
mistake of fact" as required by Idaho Code 7-1106(2)?
2.

Did the Magistrate err or abuse its discretion when it dismissed Plaintiffs

case despite the fact that Defendant failed to cite the IC 7-1106(2) and or IRCP 56(c) in
her Motion to Dismiss, failed to give notice to Plaintiff of his right to under IRCP 56(c)
to 28 days notice before the hearing, and failed to give Plaintiff twenty eight days in
violation ofIRCP 56(c)?
3.

Did the District Court err or abuse its discretion when it considered

Defendant's new arguments raised for the first time on appeal?
4.

Did the District Court err or abuse its discretion when it failed to grant

Plaintiff attorney fees in spite of Defendant's failure to comply with the obligation of
candor and pursuit of their motion without any basis in law and fact?
B. Appellants Issues Presented

1.

Did the District Court err in interpreting a "material mistake of fact" under

Idaho Code 7-1106(2)?
2.

Did the District Court err when it reversed the Magistrate's dismissal of

Gordon's custody action when genetic testing conclusively established that Gordon is not
M.H.' s biological father?
III. STAND ARD OF REVIEW

Much of this matter hinges on the interpretation of statute, specifically Idaho
Code § 7-1106 and should be reviewed de novo. Idaho Dep 't of Health & Welfare v.
McCormick, 153 Idaho 468 (2012). On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary

judgment, this Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the district court
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originally ruling on the motion. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354,
360, 93 P.3d 685, 691 (2004) (internal citations omitted). Summary judgment is
appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Fragnella v.
Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,271, (2012).

The district court's decision to award attorney fees is a discretionary decision,
subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744,
753, 86 P.3d 458, 467 (2004). To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion,
this Court considers (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it;
and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Nampa
Charter School, Inc. v. DeLaPaz, 140 Idaho 23 (2004).

IV. ARGUMENT ON ISSUES RAISED BY CROSS APPELLANT
The magistrate court abused its discretion, and the District Court
should have found so, when it dismissed the case, removed the Plaintiff from the
birth certificate, dismissed Plaintiff's custody order and Plaintiff's Motion for Relief
from Judgment in violation of Idaho Code 7-1106(2) and IRCP 7(b)(l) as Defendant
failed to cite statutory, case law or any basis in law for such dismissal and failed to
provide any evidentiary support of "fraud, duress or material mistake of fact" as
required by Idaho Code 7-1106(2).
1.

Despite Hedrick's representation in her opening brief, "Statement of the Case"
that in her Summary Judgment she, "moved to dismiss Gordon's custody complaint and
challenged the V AP on the basis of 'material mistake of fact' under Section 7-1106(2) of
the Idaho Paternity Act", R. 37-45, attached as Exhibit A for reference, failed to even cite
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Idaho Code § 7-1106, let alone allege mistake of fact or provide any arguments or
citations of the record to support her allegations of mistake.
When filing a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must notify the
opposing party of the particular grounds for the motion. The motion must "state with
particularity the grounds therefore including the number of the applicable civil rule, if
any, under which it is filed, and shall set forth the relief or order sought." Idaho R. Civ. P.
7(b)(1 ). "If a ground for summary judgment is not stated with particularity in the moving
papers, the opposing party need not address that ground. For purposes of summary
judgment, the moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of material
fact issues." Nava v. Rivas-Del Toro, 151 Idaho 853, 862-63 (2011). As Hedrick's
motion for summary judgment failed to assert any grounds for which it could be granted,
it failed to meet this standard and Plaintiff could not address those grounds.
The Idaho Supreme Court, in referring to IRCP 7(b)(l) in Patton v Patton, 88
Idaho 288, 292 (Idaho 1965):
In Steingut, supra, it was stated that 'There should be strict compliance
with the rules, otherwise they will be whittled away and become
meaningless and unenforceable' Further, practice demands that the basis of
the motion and the relief sought shall be clearly stated If this be done to
the end that the other party may not assert surprise or prejudice, the
requirement is met Monjar v Higgins, D.C., 39 F Supp 633 (1941) And,
where it fails to state with particularity, then it is not in conformity with
the Rules Trammell v Fidelity & Casualty Co of New York, D.C., 45
F.Supp. 366 (1942).
The Supreme Court in Patton reversed a custody order because the record of the
trial court was vacant of any evidence to support the claims outlined in the complaints.
The Idaho Appellate Court stated in Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho
429,432. (Idaho App. 1994) the following:
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Rule 7(b)(l), I.R.C.P .. , requires notice to the nonrnoving party of
the grounds for a motion. It states: "An application to the court for an
order shall be by motion which shall state with particularity the grounds
therefore "In Patton v Patton, 88 Idaho 288, 292, 399 P 2d 262, 264
(1965), our Supreme Court noted that this requirement of particularity in
Rule 7(b)(l) is "real and substantial" and good practice "demands that the
basis of a motion and the relief sought shall be clearly stated" so that the
other party may not complain of surprise or prejudice The Supreme Court
then reversed the trial court's order, which had modified the child support
provisions of a divorce decree following a show cause hearing, because
the show cause order had given notice only of an issue as to child custody
and not as to child support Similarly, in Hellickson v Jenkins, 118 Idaho
273, 796 P 2d 150 (Ct App 1990), we held that the magistrate erred in
considering evidence outside the pleadings on a motion under I R C P
12(b)(6) without expressly converting the motion to one for summary
judgment under IR C P 56 and giving the parties a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence pertinent to a summary judgment motion See also
Kelly v Hodges, 119 Idaho 872, 876, 811 P 2d 48, 52 (Ct App 1991)
(vacating summary judgment entered on counterclaim where the motion
had requested judgment only on the plaintiffs complaint) We do not
suggest that summary judgment may never be entered by a court sun
sponte or on grounds other than those raised by the moving party.
However, in such event, the party against whom the judgment will be
entered must be given adequate advance notice and an opportunity to
demonstrate why summary judgment should not be entered See WRIGHT,
MILLER & KANE, IOA FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2720 at 27-28
Gordon was not given adequate notice or opportunity to respond to prevent the
permanent removal of M.H. herein.

The Idaho Appellate court in Fournier v

Fournier,125 Idaho 789, 791-92 (Idaho App. 1994) upheld such statute and dismissed an

order from a Magistrate that was upheld by the District Court because of the violation of
IRCP 7(b)(l).
The opportunity to be heard and advance legal argument on dispositive
issues is essential to proper procedure As stated above, I R C P 7(b)( 1)
requires that some notice be provided to a nonrnoving party of the grounds
upon which a motion is based. In Patton v. Patton, 88 Idaho 288, 292,399
P.2d 262, 264 (1965), the Idaho Supreme Court stated that practice
"demands that the basis of a motion and the relief sought shall be clearly
stated" so that the other party may not complain of surprise or prejudice.
See Mason v. Tucker, 125 Idaho 429, 432,871 P.2d 846, 849 (Ct App
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1994) Therefore, any theory upon which an award of attorney fees is
based, either used in the trial court to award fees or selected on appeal as
the "correct theory" to uphold a correct result, must be advanced at the
trial level by the party seeking fees If a particular statute, rule or contract
is not advanced below, it cannot be the basis for upholding the award later
on appeal.
Further, the decision cannot be based on arguments or facts not before the court.
This court recently clarified in Westby v. Schaefer and Mercy Medical Center, Docket
No. 40587, 2014 Opinion No. 121, page 10, that a court cannot base its decision on
arguments not supported by affidavits or facts not before the court. The only argument in
the Summary Judgment was that Gordon was not the biological father; however, such
argument or basis is not allowed under the clear language of Idaho Code 7-1106(2),
which only allows removal from the birth certificate if the moving party establishes
"fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact".
As stated by the District Court:
"Idaho law is clear that once a birth certificate is issued upon affidavits of
paternity, and once the time for contesting the affidavits has expired, a
duly issued birth certificate can only be set aside for specific reasons.
Under LC. § 7-1106, the birth certificate becomes conclusive as to the
issue of paternity, and may only be avoided upon grounds of fraud, duress
or material mistake. In this case, there was no evidence offered to the
magistrate below other than the genetic test results.
R. 171, L. 9-15. Hedrick' s argument relating to biology may be relevant to establish
affiliation and parentage, but it is not relevant to removal of a party from the birth
certificate and to terminate parental rights once established under Idaho Code § 7-1106.
The voluntary acknowledgment of paternity (V AP) signed by Gordon and Hedrick
constituted a legal finding of paternity. The only evidence presented with the Summary
Judgment at issue and considered by the Magistrate was Dr. Wurzinger's affidavit and
paternity findings. The Magistrate Court erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT I CROSS APPELANT'S BRIEF
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when it granted a motion for summary judgment despite the motion's failure to notify
Gordon of the grounds for the motion.

2.
The Magistrate erred or abused its discretion, and the District Court
should have ruled so, when it dismissed Plaintiff's case despite the fact that
Defendant failed to cite IRCP 56(c) in her Motion to Dismiss, failed to give notice to
Plaintiff of his right to under IRCP 56(c) to 28 days notice before the hearing, and
failed to give Plaintiff twenty eight days in violation of IRCP 56(c).
I.R.C.P. 56(c) gives the non-moving party 28 days notice before a hearing. Just
as with I.R.C.P. 7(b)l, strict compliance with this rule is important. This Court dealt with
a violation of this rule previously when it reversed a district court's ruling and held that a
summary judgment was improper because Saykhamchone "was not given proper notice"
of the time available to present evidence to counter the evidence of the motion for
summary judgment as the motion did not include the proper rule of civil procedure in
violation ofIRCP 7(b)(l). Saykhamchone v. State, 900 P. 2d 795, 127 Idaho 319 (Idaho
1995). The court stated:
However, if Saykhamchone had been given a twenty-day notice of the
district court's "intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for so
doing," Saykhamchone might have been able to respond in a way that
would raise a genuine issue of material fact. LC. § 19-4906(b) (emphasis
added) ("In light of the reply ... the court may ... grant leave to file an
amended application or, direct that the proceedings otherwise continue.")
Likewise, if the state had filed a motion for summary disposition,
Saylthamchone 's reply might have been able to raise a genuine issue of
material fact.
In the case currently before the Court, no motion to shorten time was made or
granted to Hedrick, neither did Gordon stipulate to such. The record reflects the opposite
as Gordon objected to the hearing and provided a detailed list of the objections before the
Magistrate in Gordon's Motion for Relief from Judgment/ Motion for Reconsideration
R. 59-66 with the newly acquired evidence.

Gordon's Motion for Relief from the
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Judgment contained obvious and serious legal issues that should have been addressed by
the court which included the termination of any parental rights that were legally
established under Idaho Code 7-1106. Further, courts have noted there are circumstances
in which an appellate court is justified in resolving an issue not passed on below, where
the court finds "plain error" or "fundamental error." "The plain error principle is best
understood as a device for mitigating the harshness of the adversary system, serving as a
safety valve or an anchor to windward. Plain error is commonly described as constituting
only mistakes that are obvious, serious, ... egregious, substantial, manifest, highly
prejudicial or grave." Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrich, Evidence at 29
(1999) citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1984); see also Herzog v. United States,
235 F.2d 664, 666 (9 th Cir. 1956) The Court also will allow such issues as where the
proper resolution is beyond any doubt, or where, 'injustice might otherwise result."
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1975).

The magistrates application of the incorrect legal standard removing Appellant
from the life of a minor child would constitute a manifest injustice and legal issues are
common exceptions to the rule that issues not passed on below will not be reviewed by
the courts of appeals. see, Colorado Interstate Corp v. CIT Group/Equipment Fin., Inc,
993 F.2d 743, 751 (10 th Cir. 1993); In Re McLean Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 385, 387 (2d Cir.
1994) (per curiam) (we reserve 'considerable discretion' to review purely legal questions
not formally raised in the district court.").

The Ninth Circuit has held in Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F .3d 449 (9 th Cir. 1998) that waivers of questions of law are not

automatically waived if not raised as are to objections to waivers of questions of law. In
Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit stated that "[f]ailure to
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object to a magistrate judge's recommendation waives all objections to the judge's
findings of fact. (Citation omitted) However, in this circuit, failure to object generally
does not waive objections to purely legal conclusions. (Citation omitted)." Id. at 562 n.2.
In Turner v. Duncan, 15 8 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit similarly stated
"[f]ailure to object to a magistrate judge's recommendation waives all objections to the
magistrate judge's findings of fact. (Citations omitted.) While in most other circuits,
failure to object also waives any objection to purely legal conclusions (citations omitted)
that is ordinarily not the case in this circuit. (Citation omitted) Rather, a failure to object
to such a conclusion 'is a factor to be weighed in considering the propriety of finding a
waiver of an issue on appeal.'" Id. at 455.
Hedrick's brief incorrectly cited to Idaho Code 7-1115 and 7-1116 (Proceedings
to Establish Paternity) and alleged incorrectly The Idaho Paternity Act "allows and gives
great weight to genetic evidence as evidence of non-paternity and does not prohibit those
signing an acknowledgment from seeking such evidence." Defendant failed to cite the
correct section for removal from the birth certificate and failed to point out that Idaho
Code 7-1106(2) does not consider genetic evidence as a basis for removal from the birth
certificate or from the "legal finding of paternity". Genetic testing is relevant to establish
paternity, however, once the "legal finding of paternity" has been found under Idaho
Code 7-1106(2) does not consider genetic testing.
The Magistrate Court erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion when it
granted a motion for summary judgment that failed to advise Gordon of this 28 day time
period at hearing just fifteen days after the filing of the motion.
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3.
The District Court erred or abused its discretion when it
considered Defendant's new arguments raised for the first time on
appeal.

The Appellate court review is "limited to the evidence, theories and arguments
that were presented ... below." State v. Vierra, 125 Idaho 465, 469 (Idaho App.1994).
Consequently, appellate courts will not consider new arguments raised for the first time
on appeal. Dominguez ex rel. Hamp v. Evergreen Resources, Inc., 142 Idaho 7 (2005).
Hedrick's only argument presented in their Summary Judgment and at the hearing on
dismissal was that the Plaintiff was not the biological father. Any additional arguments
not raised previously are not properly before this Court. The recent Idaho Supreme Court
Decision on the 19th of September 2014, Docket 41889, Brown and Hopson v. Greenhart,
Boise, 2014 Opinion No. 100 again stated, "An issue cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal." Bank of Commerce v. Jefferson Enters., LLC, 154 Idaho 824, 828, 303 P.3d
183, 187 (2013)."
Hedrick alleged for the first time on appeal in its District Court Brief R. 143 p. 3
that she met the burden of IC 7-1106(2), despite not citing such standard in the Summary
Judgment, despite not citing the elements in the Summary Judgment, and despite not
alleging facts to support the requirements of IC 7-1106(2); nevertheless she alleged
additional facts and arguments for the first time on appeal that the Summary Judgment
was based on "a material mistake of fact as to the acknowledgment of paternity-".
Hedrick also argued for the first time after the appeal that the custody of M.H.
should be had by the biological father as raised in Hedrick's objection to Gordon's
request for temporary custody pending appeal. However, such arguments are contrary to
established law and not relevant to the original hearing. This Court has stated "Mere
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biology does not create a father with legal rights and responsibilities to a minor child."
Idaho Dep 't of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 88, 90, 244 P.3d 232, 234 (2010)
(quoting Doe v. Roe, 142 Idaho 202,205, 127 P.3d 105, 108 (2005))."
Gordon's brought to the District Court's attention that issues and arguments not
raised below and presented for the first time on appeal will not be considered or reviewed
and cited Sandpoint Convalescent Servs., Inc. v. Idao Dep't of Health and Welfare, 114
Idaho 281, 284 (1988) R. 154; however, Defendant herein continues to raise new facts,
arguments, and issues not previously raised in the Summary Judgment. Therefore, any
additional facts, arguments, or issues addressed not previously raised are not properly
before this Court and Plaintiff asks that this Court not consider such.
4.
The District Court err or abuse its discretion when it failed to grant
Plaintiff attorney fees in spite of Defendant's failure to comply with the obligation of
candor and pursuit of their motion without any basis in law and fact?

Plaintiff humbly seeks fees and costs against Defendant and her attorneys of
record under Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2, Idaho Code 12-123, 12-121, Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(l), 54(d)(l)(b) and (e)(l) and Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct
3.3. This request is made as Defendant and her counsels of record sought to remove
Plaintiff from the birth certificate in violation of IRCP 1 l(a)(l) and IC 12-123 as such
position was pursued without basis in law and in violation of Idaho rules of Professional
Conduct 3.3(1 and 2) as they knowingly failed to disclose to the tribunal legal authority
in the controlling jurisdiction and maintained such position after the controlling law was
brought to their attention.
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3: CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
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(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a
false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by
the lawyer;
(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of
the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel;

Hedrick and her counsels sought to remove Gordon from the birth certificate and
to remove his visitation rights under the sole legal grounds he was not the biological
father implying that such position is based in law and violated IRPC3.3(1 ). Hedrick and
her counsels further failed to disclose to the tribunal known legal authority in the
controlling jurisdiction known to the counsels to be directly adverse to the position of
Hedrick, namely Idaho Statute 7-1106(2), 15-5-213, 32-1705; Stockwell v. Stockwell 116
Idaho 297 (1989) and Hernandez v. Hernandez, 151 Idaho 882 (2011 ). Idaho Statutes
and case law are contrary to Defendant's position as Defendant and her counsels knew
Gordon lived with Hedrick and M.H. since birth for more than two years.

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ll(a)(l) states
... the signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the
attorney or party has read the pleadings, motion or other paper ... and that
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.
If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the
person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay the other party or parties the amount of
the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading,
motion or other paper, including reasonable attorney's fee.

Idaho Code 12-123 regarding Frivolous Conduct in a Civil Case states:
(1) As used in this section:
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(a) "Conduct" means filing a civil action, asserting a claim,
defense, or other position in connection with a civil action, or
taking any other action in connection with a civil action.
(b) "Frivolous conduct" means conduct of a party to a civil action
or of his counsel of record that satisfies either of the following:
(i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure
another party to the civil action;
(ii) It is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law and
cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.
Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2 is the similar standard for fees herein. The Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically rule 3.3,
impose the duty of candor upon the parties and their counsels. Rule 11 requires
reasonable investigation into the facts and law before signing pleadings. Rule 11 require
that the pleading be (1) well grounded in fact, (2) warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and (3) not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or
needless increases in the costs of litigation. I.R.C.P. 1l(a)(l). An attorney is required to
perform a pre-filing inquiry into both the facts and the law involved to satisfy the
affirmative duty imposed by Rule 11. Sun Valley, 119 Idaho 87 at 95 (1991).
"Reasonableness under the circumstances" is the appropriate standard to apply under
I.R.C.P. Rule 11. Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 74, 785 P.2d 634, 638 (1990).
Under the "reasonableness under the circumstances" standard, the appropriate focus of
the trial court should be whether the attorney conducted a "proper investigation upon
reasonable inquiry" into the facts and legal theories of the case. Hanf v. Syringa Realty,

Inc., 120 Idaho 364, 369, 816 P.2d 320, 325 (1991) Hedrick and her counsels knew that
Gordon had lived with M.H. and that Plaintiff was listed on the birth certificate since that
date, and had filed an action for custody in CV 2013-6155-C; nevertheless they sought to
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remove Plaintiff from the birth certificate and remove all visitations rights on the sole
grounds he was not the biological father in violation of Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
7(b)(l) as they did not cite any authority to reflect that such gave the court to remove
Plaintiff from the birth certificate and or remove any visitations rights.
Hedrick and her counsel further failed to give notice to Gordon of their type of
motion as it did not give Gordon adequate notice of the standard, burden, and time frame
of 28 days to respond limiting his ability to research and appear as required by IRCP
56(c). A reasonable pre-filing inquiry would have revealed the proper authority and
necessary elements required to remove Plaintiff from the birth certificate. It would also
have revealed that the motion was in fact one for summary judgment and Plaintiff should
have been given the proper time to respond under Rule 56.
To emphasize what is stated above, the responsibilities attendant upon signing a
document pursuant to Rule 11 require the signer certify that he has "read the pleading,
motion or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law ... and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose .... " I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(l). "If a pleading,
motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction .... " Id.
Rule 11 's mandatory language regarding sanctions make it clear that courts should
detect and enforce violations of the certification requirement. Accordingly, Rule 11 gives
the courts discretion to tailor the sanctions to the violation. "The intent of the Rule is to
grant courts the power to impose sanctions for discrete pleading abuses or other types of
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litigative misconduct." Campbell v. Kildew and Daltoso, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P.3d 731
(2005). Thereafter, the court's discretion includes that power to impose sanctions on the
client alone, solely on the counsel, or on both. See I.R.C.P. 11 (a).

Idaho Rule of

Professional Conduct RULE 3.3(a)(2) states that a lawyer shall not knowingly "fail to
disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer
to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel."
Despite this rule Hedrick's counsels elected not to bring such authority to the attention of
the Magistrate.
Counsels for Hedrick brought a motion with no basis in law and without sufficient
facts, mislabeled that motion so as to avoid giving Gordno the proper time to respond,
and knowingly failed to disclose contrary authority in an attempt to lure the finder of fact
to a hasty ruling based solely on the DNA test results. Because this conduct is exactly the
kind Rule 11 is meant to address, Gordon asks this Court to impose sanctions under
I.R.C.P. 1l(a)(l) against Hedrick and/or her counsel and grant him attorneys fees.
Finally, Hedrick's Pre Trial Memorandum in CV 2013-6155-C filed on or about the 29 th
of August 2013 admitted that she knew since birth that Plaintiff was not the biological
father of M.H. reflecting that she knowingly caused the issue herein to the detriment of
M.H., Plaintiff, and this Court.
In an attempt to limit the disruption to M.H. and to limit fees and costs, Gordon
brought the above issues before the court in its Motion for Relief and Defendant and their
counsels continued their position despite the issues presented herein contrary to
established law.
V. REPLY ARGUMENT
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1.

The District Court correctly interpreted Idaho Code§ 7-1106(2).

The burden was upon Defendant to establish fraud, duress, or material mistake of
fact and the Defendant failed to meet and failed to even attempt to meet such burden with
any admissible evidence.

As the period for rescission passed long before custody

proceedings were initiated, such an acknowledgement can "be challenged only in court
on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof upon
the party challenging the acknowledgment." Idaho Code § 7-1106(2). Such an
acknowledgement constitutes a legal finding of paternity under LC. § 7-1106(1) The
District Court correctly interpreted the mistake of fact provision to mean a mutual
mistake of fact in light of the meaning of the term and within the context of the
surrounding language and other statutes contained in Title 7.
a.

The Defendant's Plain Language of the Statute does not
Indicate that a Unilateral Mistake on the Part of the Party
Opposite the Party Seeking to Challenge the Statute is
Sufficient to Challenge a VAP.

The District Court held that "the mere fact that the mother named the wrong
father at the time of the birth of the child does not constitute a 'material mistake' in the
context of the statute that is sufficient to set the birth certificate aside." R. 172 L. 12-14.
Defendant responds by looking up the individual words in a dictionary and declaring that
any error constitutes a mistake of fact and that any error as to who is the biological father
is material in this context. This interpretation cannot stand in light of the term in its
ordinary use, the statute taken as a whole and the absurd result this type of interpretation
would create.
First, the term "material mistake of fact" is a common term used in legal settings
and particularly when dealing with contracts. It is no accident that the Legislature chose
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to use this term and it should be taken into account. To suggest that a mistake of fact on
anyone's part (perhaps even a third party) at any time should invalidate a legal finding of
paternity creates an absurd result. Of particular importance is that the term material
mistake of fact is generally on the part of one or more parties. Who has made a material
mistake of fact is important in determining who can contest a contract, who can assert
certain types of criminal defenses, or in this case, who can challenge a VAP.

To

understand the context of the term it is helpful to look to the other grounds for which a
VAP can be contested, fraud and duress.
Under the Defendant's simplistic interpretation, any fraud, duress or mistake
would invalidate a VAP. Though the statute does not explicitly state so, it can only be
assumed that the party that committed the fraud or applied the duress could not tum
around and later challenge a VAP based on their own fraud or duress. Rather, only the
party who was the victim of the fraud or duress would be able to challenge the legal
finding of paternity on those grounds. Similarly, only the party who was mistaken about
a material fact when the VAP was executed should be able to raise a challenge based on
mistake of fact.
An Illinois Appellate Court has had opportunity to address the position of a nonbiological father who had voluntarily acknowledged paternity under a similar statute.
Interpreting the "material mistake of fact" provision in their similar paternity statute, the
court found:
"In addition, even if it did have standing to challenge Alfred's on
the basis of a material mistake of fact, we do not believe that the State met
its burden The Parentage Act does not define what is required to prove a
material mistake of fact in a challenge to a YAP, but under the common
law, to rescind a contract based on a mistake of fact a party must show a
mistake as to "a material feature of the contract, that the mistake is of such
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grave consequence that to enforce the contract would be unconscionable,
that the mistake occurred notwithstanding the exercise of due care on the
part of the party seeking rescission, and that the other party can be placed
in statu quo "Keller v State Farm Insurance Co, 180 Ill App 3d 539, 548,
129 111 Dec 510,536 NE 2d 194 (1989). Something is "material" if the
party seeking rescission would have acted differently had he been aware
of the fact, or if it concerned the type of information upon which he would
be expected to rely when making his decision to act Jordan v Knafel, 3 78
111 App 3d 219, 229, 317 Ill Dee 69, 880 NE 2d 1061 (2007) It is unclear
whether the genetic identity of N C is material as to Alfred, because even
after discovering he was not the biological father he still has sought to
uphold the validity of the YAP and remain the legal father of N C Also,
even if the genetic identity of N C is material, there is nothing to suggest
Alfred should bear not the risk of such a mistake, since by signing the
YAP a man gives up his right to a genetic test to determine fatherhood
Accordingly, we do not believe the DNA test results conclusively
establish a material mistake of fact under the circumstances of this case
Likewise, the State did not establish Alfred executed the V AP due to
fraud". In re NC, 2013 IL App (3d) 120438, 993 NE 2d 134,142 appeal
allowed, 996 N.E.2d 13 (Ill. 2013).

In re NC., 373 Ill.Dec. 134 (2013)
While not binding on this Court, the interpretation of identical terms in a similar
statute and the logic presented by the court above can be helpful.
Similarly, the mistake of fact at issue here is not material. Hedrick, the party
seeking to challenge, would not have acted differently had she been aware Gordon was
not the biological father, as she has already indicated that she was in fact aware. Further,
the genetic identity of the minor child is immaterial to Gordon, who regardless seeks to
further the best interests of the minor child by continuing to be his father.
As the District Court pointed out in its Memorandum Decision "either the
Defendant knew Plaintiff was not the father ... , or she was indifferent as to who the real
father was .. .In any of the above events, a significantly greater evidentiary showing is
required before the court can consider rescinding the birth certificate and dismissing the
Complaint." R. 173 L. 10-16.

Allowing Hedrick to either defraud Gordon or be
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indifferent to the facts and later challenge the VAP based on her own fraud or
indifference to the identity of the father is an absurd result that cannot be the intention of
the Legislature.
b.
Other Sections of Title 7 Clearly State the Affect of Genetic
Testing, Demonstrating that the Legislature Intended Greater
Protections for the Legal Finding of Paternity in I.C. 7-1106.
As Hedrick points out in her opening brief, several other code sections clearly
state what the affects of a positive or negative genetic test have on certain proceedings,
LC. 7-1116(5) and §7-1118 a negative test excludes witnesses/Defendants (without a
legal finding or paternity) from paternity proceedings, and § 7-1119 where a negative
genetic test rebuts a child's presumption of legitimacy. These other statutes deal with
witnesses, defendants and children who do not already possess the stronger legal finding
of paternity that § 7-1106 confers.

That the Idaho Legislature has opted to state

definitively the effects of genetic test results in other sections, but stated that only "fraud,
duress and material mistake of fact" are sufficient to challenge a VAP indicates their
intention that a genetic test by itself is not sufficient grounds for a challenge to a VAP.
This makes sense in light of the legal importance of these acknowledgments.
Indeed a "legal finding of paternity" would have very little importance if a simple genetic
test, that can be raised in any proceeding, automatically invalidates them. Allowing a
VAP to automatically be invalidated renders the "fraud, duress or material mistake of fact
provision largely superfluous, as any such claims would not matter in light of the results
of the test. Further, Hedrick's interpretation results in serious harm to children. Under
Hedrick's interpretation of the statute a child who has enjoyed a loving relationship with
a father, without either of them even suspecting a lack of a biological relationship, can be
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ripped wholly and completely from that relationship by the mother at any time she
chooses to bring proceedings and request a genetic test. This type of "at-will" fatherhood
cannot be what the Idaho Legislature intended when it enacted LC. § 7-1106 and
damages the very children such laws were designed to protect.
c.
Plaintiff's Interpretation of the Statute is not Likely to Raise
Constitutional Issues.
Hedrick only now in an Opening Brief before the Supreme Court identifies a
potential biological father of M.H. As stated above these new factual arguments have no
place in this appeal, however, the Hedrick also raises concerns about the Constitutional
Rights of biological parents in this situation.

These constitutional concerns are

unfounded.
First, Defendant claims that the VAP did not inform her of her rights concerning
the VAP because it failed to educate her on what the meaning of mistake of fact was. As
explained above, the terms used convey that the meaning clearly.

Many statutes,

including de facto custodian, Idaho Code 32-717 (grandparent standing), and criminal
statutes regarding abuse and negligence, intrude upon a parents liberty interest in their
children, yet no court that Plaintiff is aware of has ever ruled that a failure to warn new
parents of these laws at the birth of their child constitutes violation of due process. It
seems absurd for Hedrick to claim that she defrauded, or at the very least failed to
mention a potential paternity issue, Gordon in order to induce him to take on the
responsibilities of a father, while simultaneously complaining of a due process violation
because she was not warned beforehand what the consequence of her fraud would be.
Finally, some states have elected, and Title IV-D allows, for a VAP to be a conclusive
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finding of paternity. To Plaintiffs knowledge, these statutes have not been successfully
challenged based on violations of due process.
The Constitutional rights of biological fathers is also not infringed upon by the
District Court's interpretation of the statute. Defendant argued for the first time after the
appeal that the custody of M.H. should be had by the biological father as raised in
Hedrick's objection to Gordon's request for temporary custody pending appeal.
However, such arguments are contrary to established law and not relevant to the original
hearing. This court has stated in "Mere biology does not create a father with legal rights
and responsibilities to a minor child." Idaho Dep 't of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho
88, 90,244 P.3d 232,234 (2010) (quoting Doe v. Roe, 142 Idaho 202,205, 127 P.3d 105,
108 (2005) ). "
Courts routinely rule that a biological father can lose his ability to assert rights to
a child if he fails to develop a relationship with that child. It is also important to note that
a situation such as the one before this Court currently, can only occur in the absence of a
biological father attempting to assert his rights. Citing the United States Supreme Court,
the Idaho Supreme Court declared as follows concerning the rights of an unmarried
biological father:
The United States Supreme Court held that failure to give the putative
father notice of the pending adoption proceedings did not deny him due
process where the putative father had not established any custodial,
personal, or financial relationship with the child and had not taken
advantage of the statutory procedure by which he would have acquired the
right to receive notice of adoption. The mere existence of the biological
link with his child did not merit due process protection. The Supreme
Court stated that "[t]he significance of the biological connection is that it
offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to
develop a relationship with his offspring." Id at 262, 103 S.Ct. at 2993
(emphasis added). If the biological father "grasps that opportunity and
accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy
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the blessings of the parent-child relationship .... " Id. The Court
emphasized, however, that "[p]arental rights do not spring full-blown from
the biological connection between parent and child. They require
relationships more enduring." Id. at 259-60, 103 S.Ct. at 2992 (quotation
omitted). The Court then went to great lengths to make the distinction
between fatherhood that arises out of mere biology and fatherhood that
arises out of an actual relationship with the child:
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing] forward to participate in the
rearing of his child," Caban, 441 U.S. at 392, 99 S.Ct. at 1768, his interest
in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the
due process clause. At that point it may be said that he "act[s] as a father
toward his children." Id. at 389, n. 7, 99 S.Ct. at 1766, n. 7. But the mere
existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional
protection. The actions of judges neither create nor sever genetic bonds.
"[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals
involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments
that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it
plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of children
as well as from the fact of blood relationship."
Doe v. Roe, 142 Idaho 202 206 (2005) emphasis added.

Assuming that Mr. Bobos is actually the biological father ofM.H., he has failed to
attempt to develop any sort of relationship with M.H. Courts, including this Court, have
held that the constitution is not violated by disallowing a biological father who has no
relationship with his offspring from inserting himself into proceedings after years have
passed. It was Gordon who changed M.H.' s diapers, who was there for his first steps and
first words and it is Gordon who has developed the emotional attachments and intimacy
that derive from daily association. It is Gordon who now seeks to further the best interest
of M.H. and continue to take on the rights and responsibilities of fatherhood.

2.
Because the District Court Correctly Interpreted Idaho Code §
7-1106 it was Correct in Overturning the District Court and its
Decision Should be Upheld.
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The District Court gave the terms of the statute their logical meamng.

By

understanding that the fraud, duress or mistake had to be on the part of the appropriate
party in order for a challenge to a legal finding of paternity to be successful, the District
Court preserved the intention of the Legislature in safeguarding children and preserving
familial relationships. By holding so the District Court avoided the absurd result that a
contrary interpretation would entail and avoided the harm inherent in the type of at-will
fatherhood proposed by the Hedrick.

The District Courts interpretation also avoids

running afoul of due process and parental liberty interests. Therefore, the District Court
correctly overruled the Magistrate's ruling that genetic testing automatically invalidates
an executed VAP. Plaintiff asks this Court to uphold this ruling.
CONCLUSION

Hedrick failed to cite any law, standard or case or provide the applicable evidence
or allegations in her summary judgment motion to obtain the relief sought. Hedrick also
failed to allow Gordon sufficient time to prepare to argue a motion for summary
judgment as it was improperly filed. Even if the motion for summary judgment had
correctly cited the standard and given Gordon the proper amount of time, there was no
material mistake of fact that would allow the legal finding of paternity to be successfully
challenged. It is unjust that M.H. should be tom so suddenly and completely from the
only father he has known, without at least a court first entertaining arguments concerning
his best interest.
Gordon also humbly seeks costs and fees as requested above as the District
Court's decision does not address the legal and factual deficiencies of the Motion to
Dismiss outlined in Gordon's briefing above and previously filed herein.
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